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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical analysis of training regimes as outcomes of a
complementarity between organizational and institutional factors that determine
firms’ and workers’ incentives as regards skills. Specifically, the paper
proposes that, on the one hand, knowledge embeddedness within firms is the
determinant of firms’ preferences concerning training, while, on the other, labor
market institutionalization provides the framework for workers’ preferences.
Applying a criterion of coherence between firm and worker incentives, two
stable configurations are singled out. The former is shown to correspond to the
Japanese model of training, while the latter conforms more to the German
experience.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, I20, J51, P51.
Keywords: institutional complementarity, incentives, training, labor market
institutions, company organization.
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Studie wird eine theoretische Analyse der institutionellen Regelungen
zur beruflichen Bildung vorgestellt. Sie werden als Ergebnis einer gegebenen
Komplementarität organisatorischer und institutioneller Faktoren verstanden,
die für Unternehmen und Arbeitnehmer als Anreize für Aktivitäten wirken, die
sich auf berufliche Fähigkeiten beziehen. Die Analyse legt nahe, daß für
Unternehmen die Anpassung der Wissensbestände an ihre spezifischen
Anforderungen besonders wichtig ist, während es für die Arbeitnehmer die
institutionellen Regelungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt sind.
Wird ein Parameter eingeführt, der das Maß der (Nicht-)Übereinstim-mung
zwischen den Anreizen für die Unternehmen und für die Arbeitnehmer abbildet,
dann lassen sich zwei stabile Konstellationen herausfinden. Eine entspricht
mehr dem japanischen Modell der beruflichen Ausbildung, das andere mehr
den deutschen Erfahrungen.
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1I. Introduction
An understanding of the nature of workers’ competence is increasingly regarded as
crucial for a comprehension of both micro- and macro-economic performance. With
the diffusion of new production techniques and modes of organization, skills have
today undoubtedly become the new and essential „factor of production“. For this
reason, economic literature has long been dealing with the topic of workers’
competence by investigating the determinants of skill levels and the amount of
training provided to workers by firms and/or the state.
Specifically, the economic debate has mainly focused on reasons why some
firms seem to be more willing than others to carry out a considerable amount of
training. In other words, economists have mainly being investigated a choice
between two alternatives: will firm A invest in training or will it not? These analyses
generally focus on firm-specific training, the only type easily appropriated by firms.
However, more recently a new debate has emerged which stresses the crucial role of
general training within organizations. Several authors have indeed shown that firms
have a direct interest in financing general training in spite of its low direct
appropriability.
In this paper I combine these two debates and investigate firms’ choices
between the following three options: investing in firm-specific training, investing in
general training or and not investing in any training. I mainly refer to the growing body
of literature on „comparative institutional analysis“1.
The crucial concept underlining contributions in this field is that industrialized
economies should be represented as distinct varieties of capitalism. These varieties
of capitalism are built on equally different institutional frameworks. Institutional
frameworks involve both the internal organization of firms and the macro-institutional
structure, namely the relationships between firms and the nature of product, labor
and capital markets. This framework defines the incentives that socio-economic
actors face when making economic decisions.
Given the experiences of countries such as Germany and Japan, a major
challenge for comparative institutional analysis is in fact an understanding of the
complex system of compatible incentives that allows training to be such a success
story within some (although not all) of the existing institutional frameworks. In this
paper I investigate the issue of compatibility of incentives from a theoretical point of
view and then show how my results reflect the main stylized facts from cross-country
comparisons of some major OECD countries – France, Germany, Japan and the US.
I do not use a formalized economic model, but nonetheless make explicit the
necessary game-theoretical incentive requirements for each of the above choices to
assert itself as a stable solution. I do this by analyzing the coherence between firms’
and workers’ incentives as determined by the organizational and institutional
structure. I thus identify the necessary institutional/organizational complementarities
for each different form of training to prevail. Specifically, I stress how the
embeddedness of knowledge within firms plays its role in determining firms’
appreciation of the profitability of (different forms of) training; and I also illustrate the
2fact that the attitude of workers towards training is not neutral, given that the structure
of the labor market greatly contributes to determining their incentives as regards skills
formation.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part I introduce the theoretical
model. Section II sets up my framework of analysis and introduces my notion of
institutional complementarity. In Section III I define the crucial variables at the
organizational and institutional levels, that is, „knowledge embeddedness“ and labor
market institutionalization respectively. In Section IV I apply the criterion of
complementarity between incentives at the organizational and institutional levels and
single out two coherent configurations sustaining alternative training regimes. In the
second part of the paper I draw on indirect evidence from four OECD countries to
test my theoretical results. This is done in Section V, where I first describe the main
features of training in France, Germany, Japan and the US, and then confront the
two coherent institutional/organizational configurations resulting from the theoretical
analysis with indirect evidence on national institutional frameworks and training
regimes. Section VI concludes the discussion.
II.  The Model
II.1 Outline of the Model
Training is far from homogenous across countries. Different forms of training coexist
and, as I have already mentioned, the economic debate has stressed the crucial
distinction between general and firm-specific training. However, the definition of
general training being somewhat loose, here I will make use of the more precise
concept of standardized training. Following the existing literature, one can define
standardized training as training that leads to a clearly certified skill linked to a
specific occupation (see Streeck, 1996b, for instance). Then firm-specific training can
easily be defined as training that leads to non-standardized competence.
In the following I investigate the institutional and organizational requirements –
on the labor market and within the firm – that are necessary for ensuring compatibility
between workers’ and firms’ incentives as regards these two different forms of
training. To this end I adopt an efficiency wage perspective similar to that developed
by S. Bowles (1985) and assume that: i) firms want to increase their workers’ effort
by either intensifying monitoring of work activity or increasing the workers’ cost of job
loss; ii) workers reduce their risk of remaining unemployed by acquiring standardized
rather than firm-specific training.
Concerning (i), one must note that investing in firm-specific training is indeed one
way for firms to impose on workers a higher cost of job loss because specific
competence can hardly be transferred outside the firm where it was acquired. In this
respect, therefore, the choice for firms is whether to increase effort by increasing
monitoring or to increase effort by investing in firm-specific competence. Concerning
(ii), one should stress the role of workers’ organizations as an indispensable
prerequisite for workers being able to organize collectively and have some chance of
receiving standardized training.
3Thus, within this framework the problem of compatibility of incentives becomes
crucial because workers and employers indeed have opposite interests: workers
prefer standardized training, which allows them to transfer their competence from firm
to firm; conversely, firms prefer firm-specific training, which allows them to prevent
external poaching. The role of the organizational and institutional setting is that of
bringing together these opposite incentives in order to i) make training a valuable
investment for firms and workers, ii) coordinate firms’ and workers’ incentives in such
a way that they ultimately do converge in the common choice of one form of training.
II.2 The Notion of Complementarity
Recent contributions have strongly emphasized the point that a close interplay exists,
within the institutional framework, between institutional and organizational levels. A.
Lam’s work (1998) offers an interesting attempt to integrate these two levels in a
coherent framework, yielding stimulating insights on their respective roles as
knowledge providers.
Proceeding from a similar approach, I develop a framework of analysis based on
the notion of complementarity between organizational and institutional aspects. I
assume that for a complementarity to occur the composition of social actors’
incentives determined by existing institutions and organizations must be consistent
and coherent and should provide a stable (equilibrium) configuration for their
strategies as regards training.
Specifically, I will analyze the possible complementarities between the aspects of
knowledge embeddedness within firms and institutionalization of labor markets.
These aspects combine and interplay to sustain different configurations of worker
and firm incentives, which in turn lead to different preferences on the part of these
socio-economic actors as regards training. These preferences can be combined
either in consistent ways or not. However, only in the former situation will the
outcome be stable and will the complementarity between the organizational and
institutional level indeed arise.
On the basis of the above framework, in the following sections I start with a
closer analysis of the aspects of knowledge embeddedness and labor market
institutionalization.
III. Organizations and Institutions
III.1 Knowledge embeddedness
Discussions on firm organization generally focus on the dimension of work
organization. And yet, at the same time, it is often recognized that firms’ modes of
organization can only be defined as the outcome of the interplay between work
organization and knowledge embeddedness. The importance of jointly analyzing
4these two issues is stressed by Coriat and Dosi: „we have tried to show that the
explanation of a particular set of routines can be traced back to the co-evolution
between corporate patterns of knowledge distribution and mechanisms of
coordination and governance“ (Coriat and Dosi, 1995).
If work organization mainly concerns how workers are coordinated and decisions
taken inside the firm,2 the dimension of knowledge embeddedness is bound to reflect
the way knowledge is distributed inside the firm. Hence, a good way to grasp this
notion is to start with a clear contrast between individual and collective knowledge. If
individual knowledge prevails, each piece of knowledge can be seen as a distinct
attribute of individual workers. Conversely, under a collective knowledge scenario,
know-how is spread throughout the firm: workers are led to share in the firm’s stock
of knowledge and ultimately become a building block of their firm.
To clarify the issue further, the extent of collective knowledge can be related to
workers’ involvement within a firm. In fact, involvement is generally seen as a form of
cooperation, or coworking among workers, which eventually leads to the exchange of
knowledge by fostering: „an ability to ‘feel themselves’ into new situations,
‘understand’ how specific work activities fit in the organizational context and learn
from more experienced fellow-workers“ (Streeck, 1996b, p. 149). By this very
process, knowledge loses its individual character and ultimately becomes an
organizational embedded asset. As Okuno puts it: „workers contribute to […]
production in two ways. They either work directly to produce output or work to
augment the stock of operational and organizational knowledge and the level of
[their] and other workers’ work skills“ (Okuno, 1984).
This argument is reproduced in Figure 1 below.
(Figure 1 about here)
Since, as I have just argued, collective knowledge is generally accompanied by a
high level of worker involvement in various company activities not exclusively
restricted to work duties, directly monitoring these activities would be extremely
difficult and highly costly. Thus, in these cases firms do not usually turn to direct
monitoring to enhance workers’ productivity.
As a consequence, the extent to which knowledge is indeed collectively
embedded emerges as a crucial determinant of firms’ distrust of direct monitoring as
an effort-enhancing device. This leaves firms with the problem of implementing an
alternative device to increase worker effort. In this respect one must note that the
process of knowledge collectivization itself is an essential means to offset individual
competence and substitute it with firm-specific skills, which indeed offers a solution to
the problem above (see Section IV.1).
5III.2 Labor Market Institutionalization
In this section I analyze how the dimension of labor market structure comes into play
to ensure (or hinder) the stability of a given form of training. This mainly takes place
through the crucial impact of labor market structure on the organization of workers’
interests.
To tackle this point I focus on the concept of labor markets’ „institutionalization“. I
use this term to mean a large set of institutional factors shaping the operation of the
labor market: mainly the role of trade unions and state regulation. Indeed, several
authors have recently suggested that there may well be a link between the degree of
labor market institutionalization and training systems.
The role of labor market institutionalization with respect to training is investigated
in theoretical works such as Frank and Soskice (1994) and Acemoglu and Pischke
(1997). In both cases the authors underline how institutional constraints on the labor
market may promote firms’ investment in general, portable training, such as
standardized competence, despite what economic theory would normally predict.3
These analyses mainly deal with the impact of institutions on firms’ incentives, while
a second important aspect is overlooked, namely the role of labor market institutions
with regard to the organization of workers’ interests and the shaping of their
incentives.
In this context Soskice and Hancké (1997) develop a different argument based
on the following important observation: coordination between involved actors is a
necessary precondition for any collective agreement on standards. The authors apply
this idea to skill standards and argue that the presence of strong social actors is
indeed indispensable for guaranteeing the process of skills certification necessary for
standardization. Hence, organized social actors – such as the state, business
associations and unions – are necessary in that they play the role of guarantors in
the standardization of training.
Building on this argument, one can assert that standardization indeed requires a
sufficiently institutionalized environment to prevail – for at least two main reasons.
First, because institutionalized labor markets guarantee a wide social acceptance of
qualifications as true signals of a worker’s competence, which makes standardization
viable. Second, because they provide a suitable way to convey workers’ interests
and thus establish standardization in the socio-economic arena. The latter point is
indeed crucial in this paper because it stresses the role of unions (and the state) as
institutions that are likely to give voice and „concreteness“ to workers’ demands
which would otherwise lie dormant.
IV. Establishing Complementarities in Training
To understand the essential role played by the organizational and institutional levels
explored above as regards training and competence, we shall first reconsider the
way knowledge embeddedness affects firms’ requirements with respect to
6competence and, second, make sure that the required consistency between firm-
level and institutional-level incentives is indeed satisfied.
IV.1 Knowledge and Competence
As we have seen in the previous section (III.2), involvement should indeed be taken
as an indication that collective knowledge has been implemented within a firm. As a
consequence, we have previously argued that a firm where collective knowledge
prevails is indeed likely to rely little on monitoring as an effort-enhancing device. This
leaves the firm with the problem of implementing an alternative device to improve
worker effort. However, the solution to this problem may indeed be quite simple, for
involvement itself implies a process of socialization of knowledge that is likely to favor
the acquisition of firm-specific skills by „involved“ workers. Hence, in this case firms
would increase effort by investing in a suitable form of training rather than in
monitoring.
The link between involvement and the formation of firm-specific competence is
pointed out, among others, by Okuno, who makes the following observation
concerning coworking in Japanese firms: „helping other employees learn skills and/or
making suggestions for increasing productivity can be interpreted as investing in firm-
specific capitals which take the form of accumulated knowledge of work skills and
stock of technical, organizational and managerial know-how“ (Okuno, 1984).
In fact, one essential feature of organizations strongly relying on worker
involvement is that workers’ ability to communicate within the firm becomes a
valuable asset. Workers are then led to develop important relational skills, which are
an intrinsically firm-specific component of the skills packet. Hence, the impact of
knowledge collectivization on skills stems from the fact that this process requires
workers to develop good relational competence, which in turns implies skills being
made specific to the firm, at least to some extent.
The above arguments indeed point to collectivization of knowledge as the crucial
element that creates, within the firm, the need for a profound re-modeling of workers’
competence. It is then straightforward to note that, within the alternative option of
individual knowledge, completely different consequences as regards worker
competence are to be found. Rather roughly, one could say that, lacking the
incentive offered by knowledge collectivization, firms indeed decide against actively
re-modeling worker competence and ultimately prefer to organize their internal
structure around existing workers’ skills.
IV.2 The Interplay between the Organizational and Institutional Level
A twofold result can be deduced from the analysis elaborated in the previous
sections concerning the structure of preferences – over (various forms of) training –
resulting from the possible organizational/institutional configurations.
7The first conclusion is that collectivization of knowledge is the crucial „push
factor“ at the firm level, which leads firms to require a broad re-modeling of worker
competence that ultimately make skills firm-specific. This does not happen when
individual knowledge prevails within firms.
A second conclusion concerns the role of the institutional framework and states
that standardized competence requires highly institutionalized labor markets in order
to prevail. Hence, labor market institutionalization is the second push factor – this
time on the worker side – contributing to making workers’ preferences for
standardized competence a concrete demand within the economic arena.
Building on this twofold result, we can now deduce four different incentive
configurations that stem from the four institutional/organizational frameworks created
by combining the two alternative forms of knowledge within the firms with the two
alternative forms of institutionalization on the labor markets. The result of this
exercise is summarized in Table 1 below.
(Table 1 about here)
Table 1 reproduces the four organizational/institutional options and the structure of
incentives that each of them sustains. By combining them we can define four
possible scenarios for training, which I analyze in the following.
In Case (1), highly institutionalized labor markets allow workers to demand a
process of certification of competence, which easily builds on the loose competence
requirements of firms characterized by individual knowledge: standardized training is
then one incentive-compatible solution. The second such solution is depicted in Case
(3), where collectivization of knowledge within firms combines with weak workers’
demands from poorly institutionalized labor markets, which indeed favors a broad
re-shaping of competence in a firm-specific direction. Within the two remaining
scenarios training is indeed unlikely to take place – either because of a lack of clear
incentives (Case (4)) or because of an institutional/organizational conflict (as in Case
(2)).
Hence, the previous analysis leaves us with only two coherent
organizational/institutional configurations respectively supporting a standardized and
a firm-specific training regime. In the former case the complementarity of incentives is
exploited between individual knowledge and highly institutionalized labor markets,
while in the latter case investments in training emerge out of the alternative
complementarity between collective knowledge and loosely institutionalized labor
markets. The next step is to confront these theoretical results with stylized facts on
national training regimes in some OECD countries: France, Germany, Japan and the
US. This exercise can provide insights as to whether the theoretical model previously
developed can be usefully applied to interpret the existence of different training
regimes across major developed economies.
8V. From Institutional to National Models
In this section I tentatively answer the question as to whether the theoretical model
above can indeed help us understand the differences in training regimes across four
developed countries (France, Germany, Japan and the US). To do so, I first have to
describe the main features of the training systems in these countries.
V.1 Four National Systems of Training
Widespread evidence on the Japanese model describes it as a combination of a
strong general education system delivering widely recognized diplomas and a
fragmented professional training system organized on a company-group basis.4 No
economy-wide system of training exists, and formal firm-based training is actually
combined with more informal on-the-job training to generate very firm-specific
competence.
As regards the US, the fragmentation of vocational training is generally stressed
in the literature. This fragmentation acts to prevent the emergence of economy-wide
vocational diplomas. No developed system of firm-sponsored training exists; indeed,
external observers often stress the lack of investment in training by American firms.5
According to most scholars, the German model of training and labor market
organization is a good example of a truly different solution to the problem of
competence formation.6 A well-established system of firm-sponsored training delivers
generally recognized diplomas and qualifications. There is a well-developed skills
market that can provide firms with the required qualified workers.
Finally, the French experience is often described as one of widely accepted
professional diplomas awarded by a state-based vocational training system coupled
with a strong general education system.7 Both of these are recognized as indications
of a worker’s potential. Therefore, actual competence is a mixed product of general
and vocational education (possibly) combined with on-the-job training.
Building on these brief observations, we can describe the prevailing training
systems in each of the above countries by positioning them along the two axes
ranking the nature of competence from low to high standardization and the nature of
training from weakly to highly firm-sponsored (see Figure 2 below).
(Figure 2 about here)
This figure shows that a difference exists among the countries observed regarding
both the extent of sponsoring by firms and the standardization of competence. In
particular, firm-sponsored training is well established in Germany and Japan (but not
9in France and the US), while standardized competence exists in Germany and
France (but not in Japan and the US).
The unanswered question, then, is to what extent these results support (or
distort) my previous theoretical analysis. To answer this question I will tentatively
summarize the stylized facts from indirect literature as regards knowledge
embeddedness and labor market institutionalization in the four countries studied.
V.2 Knowledge Embeddedness in OECD Countries
The notion of knowledge embeddedness can be usefully applied to understand the
modes of organization prevailing in countries such as the US, France, Japan and
Germany. In fact, a large body of literature has been recently devoted to collecting
and presenting evidence on the nature of firms’ organization in both national and
comparative perspectives. Although this evidence mainly focuses on issues related
to work organization, it also delivers insights on workers’ involvement and, hence,
knowledge embeddedness.
In this respect, many authors have pointed out (see Aoki, 1986; Okuno, 1984)
that the typical Japanese firm is a clear example of a horizontal organization of work
relying on a strong form of worker involvement. This stresses the crucial role of
collective knowledge within Japanese firms, and this result should be contrasted with
evidence from the German codetermination system. This latter production model is
built on formal coordination among distinct categories of workers, which is far from
the „informal empathy“ typical of cooperation among Japanese workers. Organization
within German firms builds on a system of coordination among workers who refuse to
undergo a process of involvement (see Streeck, 1996a, on this point). In this sense,
knowledge here is an individual attribute. The same type of evidence can be provided
for French and American firms, where indeed no involvement is found.
These arguments allow me to establish a tentative cross-country ranking as
regards knowledge embeddedness, summarized in Figure 3 below.
(Figure 3 about here)
We can conclude that one should distinguish between, on the one hand, the
Japanese experience of collective knowledge and, on the other, the French, German
and American (heterogeneous) forms of individual knowledge.
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V.3 Labor institutions in OECD countries
Broad agreement exists among economists as to the presence of strong „binding“
institutions on most European labor markets, mainly due to the role of different kinds
of employee organizations and/or the state. Hence, with respect to the four countries
dealt with here, it is straightforward to say that both France and Germany, unlike
Japan and the US, are typical examples of highly institutionalized labor markets. This
is synthesized in Figure 4 below.
(Figure 4 about here)
In fact, Germany represents a clear example of the role played by institutions on
the labor market to favor skills certification. Thelen and Kume observe: „In Germany,
the state actively organized the artisanal sector and endowed it with parapublic
authority in the area of skills formation...German unions emerged in the early Weimar
years as potential allies in support of a solidaristic [i.e. standardized] skill formation
regime for industry“ (Thelen and Kume, 1999, p.5). The same kind of role has also
been played by the state in France (see Verdier, 1998).
In the next section I will combine the empirical observations made in the previous
sections and see how the organizations and institutions in the four countries
observed shape the nature of their training regimes.
V.4 National Models
In fact, if we now apply the theoretical results in Table 1 above to the
characterizations of national organizational/institutional settings given in Figures 3
and 4, we can describe our four national configurations as follows. Japan represents
an example of a company-driven training regime, where collective knowledge pushes
firms to successfully invest in firm-specific competence without experiencing
resistance from workers on poorly institutionalized labor markets: this indeed
corresponds to my second consistent configuration, i.e. Case (3) in Table 1.
Germany (and to some extent France), by contrast, exemplifies highly
institutionalized labor markets in a context where firms merely rely on individual
knowledge, which indeed sustains a standardized training regime: this is my first
coherent configuration envisaged in Case (1) in Table 1.
Finally, an organizational and institutional vacuum is particularly evident in the
US, where the absence of knowledge collectivization at the firm level combines with
poorly institutionalized labor markets (as predicted in Case (4) in Table 1). This may
indeed partly explain why the US is trapped in a poor training equilibrium – as
suggested in Section V.1. These observations are summarized in Figure 5 below.
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(Figure 5 about here)
It clearly appears from the above that the theoretical model developed in the first part
of the paper does provide us with suitable categories for understanding some
components of national training systems.
V.I Concluding Remarks
This paper argued that the stability of training regimes depends on the consistency
between workers’ and firms’ incentives as determined by the organizational and
institutional structure. Specifically, I have shown that a standardized (or, by contrast,
firm-specific) form of training can actually be sustained as the outcome of a stable
institutional/organizational configuration relying on individual (collective) knowledge
within firms coupled with highly (poorly) institutionalized labor markets. This stresses
the role of complementarities between organizations and institutions within the
economic system in shaping social actors’ incentives and sustaining consistent
economic choices, such as investment in training.
To conclude, one should note that the alternative between firm-specific and
standardized competence is crucial in that the result will affect workers’ cost of job
loss and might therefore impact on macro-economic variables such as the equilibrium
rate of unemployment.8 In so doing, the nature of competence may indeed have an
important feedback effect on the institutional/organizational structure itself. This
feedback might precisely act to reinforce the corresponding
institutional/organizational configurations. If this is the case, the two coherent
configurations set out in Table 1 would then define distinct models that should indeed
be looked at as long-term institutional trajectories.
12
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Notes
                                                       
1 The following authors and works are all useful references in this field: Aoki, 1986; Boyer and
Hollingsworth, 1997; Soskice, 1990; Streeck, 1996a and 1996b.
2 Two polar solutions are generally proposed: vertical and horizontal organization of work. In the
vertical model a central authority is in charge of all decisions and guarantees coordination inside
the firm, whereas in horizontal models decision-making is often a workers’ matter and
coordination is highly decentralized.
3 See Becker (1962) on this last point. Acemoglu and Pischke’s argument stresses the role of labor
market institutionalization as a way to implement „beneficial distortions“ in the structure of wages
that make general training profitable for private actors (i.e. firms). The authors show theoretically
that in the presence of a wage structure compressed from below, general training becomes
advantageous for firms. In fact, in this case firms find it profitable to train workers up to the level
where their productivity equals the minimum wage level fixed by institutional constraints.
4 See, in particular: Aoki, 1986; Asanuma,1989; Caroli, 1995; Maurice, 1993; Müller and Shavit,
1998; Okuno, 1984; Soskice and Hancké, 1997; Streeck,1996b; Thelen and Kume, 1999.
5 One can usefully read: Allmendinger,1989; Berg, 1994; Caroli, 1995; Lynch, 1994; Müller and
Shavit, 1998; OECD economic surveys on the US, 1993-1996. Data on training in the US versus
Europe and Japan can be gathered from different sources: OECD (1994, Table 4.7) reports for
the US a significantly lower percentage of young workers receiving formal training than for the
other countries (10.2% for the US versus 23.6% for France, 67.1% for Japan and 71.5% for
Germany). Berg (1994) provides data from case studies evidencing the same or similar results.
6 Interesting works here are: Allmendinger,1989; Berg, 1994; Brauns et al., 1997; Caroli, 1995;
Lane, 1989; Marsden, 1990; Maurice, 1993; Maurice et al., 1982; Müller and Shavit, 1998;
Soskice and Hancké, 1997; Streeck, 1996a and 1996b; Thelen and Kume, 1999.
7
 One can read the several comparative works on the German versus the French training model
cited above. In addition,  see: Caroli, 1995; Eyraud et al., 1990; Lane, 1989; Müller and Shavit,
1998; Soskice and Hancké, 1997.
8 Gatti (1998) and Gatti (1999) propose, for instance, two efficiency wage models where
institutional settings (i.e. worker competence, firm organization, business coordination and
competition) affect both the unemployment rate and firms’ innovation trajectories.
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